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Abstract: This paper empirically investigates explanations to the gender wage gap in
urban Nicaragua for 2005 and 2009. For this task, using data from the EMNV survey, we
applied an Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition (standard and correcting for selection
bias) of the mean wage and the novel Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression
method introduced by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) for the wage distribution. In
this way, we explore in detail which factors influence the mean wage gap and the presence
of a “sticky floor effect”. The results show that the wage structure accounts for a large
share of the differences in mean wages and across the distribution. We do not find evidence
that selection bias affects this result for the mean. Moreover, we found a reduction in the
wage gap and in discrimination during the period of study, especially at the lower and
upper part of the distribution. We argue that the mean gap and the differences at the
upper half are driven by taste-based discrimination outlined in Becker’s (1971) view. In
contrast, the sticky floor effect is driven by occupational segregation due to discrimination
in commerce and service activities. Meanwhile, at the upper part of the distribution this
effect appears in sales and clerical occupations.
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1 Introduction
After a period of economic stagnation, rising unemployment and hyperinflation during the
mid-1980s and early 1990s, Nicaragua has experienced sustained economic growth during
the period 1994-2009 (see figure 10 in appendix).1 Despite these improvements, a high
level of inequality still persists, as proven by the Gini index of 0.46 for 2009 (Gobierno de
Reconciliacio´n y Unidad Nacional -GRUN-, 2012).2 This suggests that certain sectors of
the population have not benefited to the same extent from positive economic growth.
In this context, gender inequality in the Nicaraguan labor market is of special inter-
est; as historically women have faced greater obstacles to access the labor market and
lower returns to their work. Although this topic has been extensively discussed for de-
veloped countries and several Latin American countries, it is an under-researched area
for Nicaragua, which is the second poorest country in Latin America (ECLAC, 2012).3
Furthermore, the study of gender disparities in Nicaragua is more relevant nowadays; as
the country is in a process of change in the gender roles towards a greater labor division
within the household. As a result, women are able to participate more actively in the
labor market (Agurto, Guido, Alaniz, Sandino, Acevedo and Michell, 2008).
The existing literature on the prevalence of gender wage differentials in Nicaragua
is very scarce. In particular, the few studies that exist have not analyzed beyond the
mean wage based on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (1973) and extensions. This
approach divides the mean wage gap into two components: composition (explained part)
and wage structure (unexplained part) effect. The first, measures differences in observed
characteristics between men and women, whereas the latter accounts for the differences
in the returns to these characteristics, which are generally attributed to the effect of
discrimination (Oaxaca, 1973; Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2010). Indeed, it has been the
wage structure effect which has prevailed as the major determinant of the gender wage
differentials in Nicaragua to date (see e.g. Agurto et al. 2008; Enamorado, Izaguirre and
1According to data from the Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN), the average real GDP growth (%) of
Nicaragua over the period 1994-2009 was 3.8%.
2Although Nicaragua has high levels of income inequality, it has been reduced over the last years. The
Gini index fell from 0.51 in 2005 to 0.46 in 2009 (GRUN, 2012). Furthermore, Nicaragua has been one
of the Latin American countries with greater decrease in inequality in recent years (Economic Comission
for Latin America and the Caribbean -ECLAC-, 2012).
3According to ECLAC (2012), the incidence of poverty in Nicaragua, measured as the proportion of
the population living below the poverty line, is 58.3% in 2009. This figure is only higher in Honduras, in
which the incidence of poverty is 67.4% in 2010.
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N˜opo, 2009). Thus, previous evidence reveals that “pure discrimination” and not the
difference in workers’ endowments is the main reason behind the gender wage gap. In this
context, pure gender discrimination can be defined as the unequal treatment (different
wages) to women with the same productive capabilities as men (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
Nevertheless, discrimination appears due to different reasons such as employer’s taste,
statistical discrimination or occupational segregation.
Moreover, the wage gap is not homogeneous across the entire wage distribution. In
fact, looking at different percentiles (see figure 1) we observe that the disparity in wages
in urban Nicaragua for 2005 have some sort of a U-shaped form. The gaps are larger at
the bottom and the top of the distribution, although the largest difference is observed at
the lower percentiles. This is known as a “sticky floor effect” (Arulampalam, Booth and
Bryan, 2007). Meanwhile, for 2009 the gaps have been reduced at both extremes of the
distribution. The largest difference is still observed at the bottom of the distribution.
Figure 1: Gender Wage Gap in Urban Nicaragua
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
Taking into account these issues, this research seeks to go beyond the existing literature
by analyzing in detail the determining factors of the gender wage gap in urban Nicaragua
for 2005 and 2009. In so doing, we aim to extend the existing literature in several ways.
Firstly, we perform a detailed decomposition of the mean wage gap for 2005 and 2009. In
this way, it is possible to capture the different forms that discrimination takes. Secondly,
we update the determinants of the wage gap for 2009, which have not been explored
before. Thirdly, we control for potential sample selection bias using the two-step procedure
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proposed by Heckman (1979). A large literature stresses that standard techniques may
produce biased estimates when using only samples of working individuals. In this manner,
it is acknowledged that the estimated wage differentials and the decomposition might be
different when accounting for the effect of labor market participation. Fourthly, we provide
a better understanding of the labor market in Nicaragua by exploring the determining
factors of labor market participation in the urban area, which has not been addressed
before - at least to the best of our knowledge - from a gender perspective.4
Finally and more importantly, we carry out detailed decompositions for the wage
distribution rather than only for the mean. In so doing we are the first study - to the
best of our knowledge - that applies this type of decomposition for Nicaragua. Recent
studies (see e.g. Albrecht, Bjo¨rklund and Vroman, 2003; Chi and Li, 2008) have stressed
the importance of this type of analysis, as the gender wage gap tends to be different
across the distribution, as observed in figure 1 for the case of urban Nicaragua. The
detailed decomposition allows us to estimate the specific effect of different factors to the
wage differential and evaluate if the impact is the same across the distribution. This
was not possible to carry out in a holistic manner until the recent development of the
Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009).
This technique performs a detailed decomposition of the wage distribution in the same
vein of the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder method. More importantly, the decomposition
results are based on unconditional quantiles, so it computes the direct effect of a given
factor on a specific percentile of the distribution, which is of particular interest in applied
economics (Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2009).
In order to capture the different forms that discrimination can take and to test if
observed characteristics such as human capital have an impact along the wage distribution,
we study the effect of the differences in educational attainment, experience, regions and
job-related characteristics on the gender wage gap. The latter variables allow us to analyze
the relation between occupational segregation and discrimination.
By means of these contributions, this study aims to answer five questions: Does par-
ticipation into the labor market affect the differences in wages by gender? Are discrimi-
natory levels in average wages been reduced between 2005 and 2009? Does discrimination
4Previous research has analyzed the probability of working in a given job (see Gutierrez, Paci and
Ranzani, 2008) and the probability of working of the youth who chose not to study (see Central Bank of
Nicaragua -BCN-, 2012).
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have the same effect on the wage gap along the distribution? What are the factors in
which discrimination takes form? Does differences in endowments play a role in offsetting
discrimination in mean wages and across the distribution?
In order to answer these questions, we apply decomposition methods using data from
the National Household Living Standards Survey (EMNV) for 2005 and 2009. Nicaragua
provides an interesting scenario to study the gender differences in wages during this period
because in 2007, Daniel Ortega in representation of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacio´n
Nacional (FSLN) party, came into office. Since then, a new package of policies towards
social issues including gender equity were implemented in substitution of the trickle-down
approach based on the Washington Consensus. Thus, our data does not only provide an
updated view of the wage gaps but also might capture some of the effects of the policy
shift under Ortega’s administration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature that analyzed the
gender wage gap in Latin America with special focus in Central American countries and
especially Nicaragua. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes
the data of the National Household Living Standards Survey (EMNV). Section 5 explains
the empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses the results of the decompositions. Finally,
conclusions will be presented in section 6.
2 Literature Review
A large extensive literature has analyzed the determining factors of inequalities in the
labor markets.5 Extensive research into this topic is based on decomposition methods,
which allows for studying of the differences in wages by population groups. This literature
has its origins on the seminal papers of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) which are
inspired by Becker’s (1971) work on discrimination. From these contributions, many
scholars have extended this approach by looking at differences in mean wages (see e.g.
Reimers, 1983; Neumark, 1988; Cotton, 1988; Fortin, 2008) and recently at changes across
the distribution (see e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux,
5An alternative approach explores the inequalities at household level (focused on income), which is
practically an extension of the literature on wage distribution (see e.g. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig
(2005) and Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2008).
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1996; Machado and Mata, 2005; Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2009).6
Gender wage disparities have been of special interest. Although most of the studies
on this issue have been applied on the developed world, there is growing interest in
understanding the determinants of women’s participation in the labor market in Latin
America, and the explanations of a wage gap favoring men. An early contribution on
this topic for the region can be found in Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992), who
compile case studies for 15 Latin American countries during the 80s. Using national
household surveys, most of the studies reviewed apply an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition,
correcting for potential sample selection bias in the way suggested by Heckman (1979).
The decompositions are done based on a Mincer-type equation which uses hourly wages
or monthly earnings as dependent variable and years of schooling, experience, experience
squared and hours worked -in some cases- as regressors. Among the overall findings,
most of the differences in wages between men and women are attributed to unexplained
factors, which Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992) argue represent an “upper bound
to discrimination”. This is because there are other factors that might influence wages
which are not included in the estimations, consequently the level of discrimination would
be upward biased.
A recent attempt to summarize the findings on gender wage gaps in the region is in
Atal, N˜opo and Winder (2010), who survey the literature for 18 countries in a multi-
country approach and country-specific studies. Three important considerations can be
derived from their review. Firstly, cross-country heterogeneities avoid reaching a con-
sensus whether disparities in earnings by gender in the region have been reduced over
time or not.7 Secondly, the mixed evidence suggests that wage gaps are still present
even when women have increased their participation in the labor market. Thirdly, al-
though discrimination seems to have declined over time, it still plays an important role
in wage differentials. Moreover, as the gender gap in schooling has narrowed (Duryea,
Galiani, N˜opo and Piras, 2007), other observed factors such as experience or labor market
segregation, might have more relevance in determining the wage gap.
For Central American countries, Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992) and Atal, N˜opo
6Comprehensive reviews on this topic can be found in Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2008) and
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010), especially regarding regression-based decompositions.
7N˜opo and Hoyos (2010) find a reduction in the wage gaps for the same 18 Latin American countries
as a whole between the early 90s and the mid-2000s.
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and Winder (2010) have found relatively low gender wage gaps compared to other Latin
American countries. Nevertheless, the determinants of the earnings gap are different
across countries. In Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992) it is found that females earn
about 80% of males earnings for 1989 in Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama´ and Guatemala.
For the first three countries, these differences appear to be mainly accounted by unob-
served characteristics, including discrimination. Meanwhile, half of the earnings differen-
tials in Guatemala is explained by endowment factors, although discrimination appears to
be more important in the formal sector (Arends, 1992). In accordance with these results,
Tenjo, Ribero and Bernat (2005) also find evidence of discrimination in Costa Rica and
Honduras for 1989 and 1998, although for the case of Honduras this effect is being offset
by higher women endowments.8.
Some limitations in the studies compiled by Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992)
and in Tenjo, Ribero and Bernat (2005) is that the potential non-linear relation between
earnings and educational attainment, as well as the effect of occupational segregation
in wages are not explored. Regarding the latter, it has been shown that the presence
of segregation in the labor market in some Latin American countries (see e.g. Deutsch,
Morrison, N˜opo and Piras, 2005). This might influence wages of women and men if
segmentation comes from differences in skills or job-preferences (Polacheck, 1985; Anker,
1997). Furthermore, segmentation may also arise as a result of discrimination on the
choice of occupations (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
Aware of this issue, Atal, N˜opo and Winder (2010) include job-related characteristics
in a framework that uses matching comparisons in order to analyze the earnings gaps in
18 Latin American countries.9 Nevertheless, different from previous research, they do not
find evidence that segregation is a relevant determinant of the earnings gap for the 18
countries analyzed. They also observe that Central American countries show lower gender
gaps compared to the rest of the countries in Latin America. Moreover, it is found that a
greater share of the wage gap is accounted by unobserved characteristics. This suggests
that discrimination might still play an important role. The same consideration is given
by Enamorado, Izaguirre and N˜opo (2009).
8This argument is built on the results of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using a standard Mincerian
earnings function
9The authors include variables that capture the type of employment, formality, occupational category
and firm size. For further reference on the matching procedure see N˜opo (2004).
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Despite extensive discussions about the role of women in the Nicaraguan labor mar-
ket, there is little knowledge about the gender wage gap and its determinants.10 Monrroy
(2008) observes that the difference in average wages between men and women (as per-
centage of men wages) is 19.8% for 2005. Meanwhile, Agurto et al. (2008) estimate that
women earn about 79% of men wages in 2006. Using their calculations, the differences in
wages between men and women (as percentage of men wages) is 21.0% for 2006. Contrary
to these findings, Atal, N˜opo and Winder (2010) find a much lower wage gap (as a per-
centage of women wages) of 1.5% also for 2005. In addition, Enamorado, Izaguirre and
N˜opo (2009) estimate a reduction in the wage gap (as a percentage of women wages) from
5.1% in 1998 to 2.6% in 2005. Furthermore, they report a greater gap of 17.2% among
urban workers in 2005.
There is a problem of comparability in these studies, which influences the large dis-
crepancies among the estimated gaps. First, Agurto et al. (2008) use a household survey
undertaken by the Fundacio´n Internacional para el Desaf´ıo Econo´mico Global (FIDEG)
in 2006.11 In contrast, Monrroy (2008), Atal, N˜opo and Winder (2010) and Enamorado,
Izaguirre and N˜opo (2009) use the National Household Living Standards Survey (EMNV).
Second, while Atal, N˜opo and Winder (2010) select a sample that covers individuals be-
tween ages 18-65, Monrroy (2008) and Agurto et al. (2008) include individuals from 10
years old onwards and between ages 11-64 respectively. In a more flexible selection, En-
amorado, Izaguirre and N˜opo (2009) account for all the individuals in the sample that
show positives hourly wages. Third, Monrroy (2008) assess differences in mean wages
between men and women using males as reference group, while Atal et al. (2010) chose
women as reference.
Although the existing evidence shows mixed estimations of the raw gap, the deter-
minants of the gender gap seem to be similar in these studies. In Agurto et al. (2008)
an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is implemented in the same way as in Psacharopoulos
and Tzannatos (1992).12 They argue that unobserved characteristics including discrim-
ination against women explains 91.2% of the earnings gap (in favour of men) and the
differences in endowments account for the remaining 8.8%. Moreover, they observe that
10Tinoco and Agurto (2003) and Agurto et al. (2008) are specialized researches on socio-economic
status of women in Nicaragua.
11FIDEG is an independent think tank specialized on socio-economic research.
12Instead of estimating the model by OLS, a tobit (truncated) regression model is computed in order
to control by self-selection due to non observed earnings.
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men have higher returns to schooling and (potential) experience compared to women.
Consistent with this view, using a matching procedure, Atal, N˜opo and Winder (2010)
and Enamorado, Izaguirre and N˜opo (2009) report that a significant share of the wage
gap is accounted by unexplained factors (including discrimination), with this effect being
greater in urban areas.
Some limitations in these studies exist; it is only possible to identify the aggregate
decomposition and it does not account for potential sample selection bias. Regarding
the latter, standard techniques may produce biased estimates when using non-random
samples. Therefore, a large number of studies have addressed this issue by applying a
sample selection correction.13 In this paper, we correct for potential sample selection bias
using the two-step procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) and we discuss the sensibility
of the results by comparing it with the standard Oaxaca-Blinder method.
Furthermore, since most of the evidence relies on the Oaxaca-Blinder method, there is
no formal discussion about the gaps across the earnings distribution. Some considerations
can be found in Monrroy (2008), who find that unskilled workers such as laborers and
farm workers show the smaller gap and the largest gap appears to be in the agricultural
and fishing sectors. Moreover, N˜opo and Hoyos (2010) find that the unexplained gap is
greater at the top of the distribution and has increased at the top half of the earnings
distribution (45th-100th percentiles) between 1993-2005.
In our case study for urban Nicaragua, the determinants of the wage gap at differ-
ent points of the distribution using the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression
method introduced by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) are explored. As mentioned
before, the RIF regression is a novel method that has begun to take place in the empirical
literature that addresses wage inequalities.14 Regarding gender wage gap, this approach
has been useful for understanding the factors that explain the presence of “sticky floor”
and “glass ceiling” effects.15 The advantage of this approach is that allows us to compute
a detailed decomposition as in a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. In this way, it
13See Vella (1998) and Beblo, Beninger, Heinze and Laisney (2003) for an extensive discussion of the
methods that deal with the sample selection problem.
14There are other methods that also decompose the entire distribution of wages. Some of them can be
found in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), Machado and Mata (2005) and Chernozhukov, Fernandez-
Val and Melly (2009). See Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010) for a deeper discussion on these approaches.
15Albrecht, Bjo¨rklund and Vroman (2003) define the glass ceiling effect as a larger wage gap at the
upper part of the distribution.
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is possible to evaluate if the effects of different factors are the same across the distribution.
Other authors have looked these issues using the RIF method and found different
results. For example, Chi and Li (2008) found a sticky floor effect in urban China during
1987-2004. This effect is driven by lower returns to education for women, which suggest
evidence of discrimination at the bottom of the distribution. Moreover, the gap at the
upper end of the distribution is mainly accounted by difference in human capital. In
contrast, Salardi (2013) found the presence of both effects (sticky and glass ceiling) for
Brazil during 1987-2006. She observes that these effects are driven by the wage structure,
especially at the bottom of the distribution, although it has declined over time. A different
approach is taken by Adireksombat, Zheng and Sakellariou (2010), who analyze changes
in the wage differences by gender over time (1991-2007) for Thailand. They found the
presence of sticky floors effects, which are mainly explained by discrimination. However,
they also report a reduction in gender inequality during the period of study.
As mentioned before, previous research for Nicaragua provides only suggestive evidence
of the patterns of the wage gap along the distribution. In this paper, we go beyond by
performing a detailed decomposition of the differences in wages across the distribution.
Even when previous evidence shows that discrimination accounted for a large share of the
mean wage gap in 2005 and 2006, our study is an initial effort to test if this view is the
same at different percentiles for 2005 and 2009 and which form of discrimination prevails.
3 Why Do Women Have Lower Wages than Men?
Economists have since long studied the determining factors of the gender wage gap based
on a Mincer-type (1958) earnings equation,
ln(wi) = α + γssi + β1xi + β2x
2
i + εi (1)
where w is the hourly wage of worker i, s corresponds to the schooling level and
x is the work experience. α is a constant term and ε is an error term that included
unobserved characteristics, which are assume to be uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables [E(ε|s, x) = 0].
Equation (1) has been extended over time by including other covariates and relaxing
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the functional form. In this regard, economic theory emphasizes that differences in human
capital (education, experience, skills), preferences, occupational segregation and discrimi-
nation may explain why women may have lower wages than men (see Becker, 1971; Anker,
1997; Altonji and Blank, 1999). Thus, following Oaxaca (1973), all the observable indi-
vidual characteristics that capture these issues (X) are included in the right hand side of
the equation,
Yi = Xiβi + εi (2)
where Y corresponds to ln(w). i is composed of males A and females B. ε is assumed
to be independent of the covariates (E[εi|X] = 0).
Based on equation (2), the mean wage gap is given by,
E(YA − YB) = E(XA)βA − E(XB)βB (3)
Subsequently, we add and subtract the counterfactual βAXB, which is the average
wage that females would have if they had the same returns to observed characteristics as
males. Thus, equation (3) can be rearranged as follows,
E(YA − YB) = [E(XA)− E(XB)]βA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Composition effect
+E(XB)[βA − βB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage structure effect
(4)
Based on equation (4), the determinants of the wage gender gap can be divided into
two main sources, one is attributed to differences in observed characteristics (composition)
and the other to differences in the returns between groups, under the assumption that
they share the same characteristics (wage structure). The latter is related to differences
due to discrimination. We build our empirical strategy following this framework, which
we discuss next.
3.1 Composition Effect
3.1.1 Human Capital Theory
One of the sources of the gender wage gap is the differences in the composition of the
workforce. The human capital model states a positive relation between educational at-
tainment, experience and earnings (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Therefore, to the extent
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that women have lower endowments than men, they may be less paid. A key factor in
this model is that investment in human capital depends on how much time the individual
expects to devote to market and non-market work (Altonji and Blank, 1999). This deci-
sion might be influenced by marital status, child-bearing and child-caring, as these factors
determine the division of labor in the household and therefore market work decisions over
the life-cycle (Polachek, 2004). If the individual expects to work less hours or less years,
the benefits from investing in human capital are lower and thus the incentives are smaller
(Polachek, 2004).
Altonji and Blank (1999) point out that differences in human capital favoring men
might also be a result of discrimination to access education, which they called as “pre-
labor market discrimination”. Also, discrimination towards women might arise within the
family. For example, if it is perceived that boys’ are more likely to be more economically
active than girls, parents may prefer to invest more in boys education (Das Gupta, 1987).
It has been argued that it is difficult to separate the effects of these sources of discrim-
ination from the effects predicted by the human capital model (see Altonji and Blank,
1999). Nevertheless, this might not be the case for urban Nicaragua. Firstly, Monrroy
(2008) observes that female participation in the labor market is higher in the urban area.
Secondly, women labor market participation in urban areas has increased from 35.6% in
1993 to 45.6% in 2005 (Monrroy, 2008). Thirdly, fertility rates have decreased from 7.3
births per woman in the early 60s to 2.7 births per woman in 2009 (The World Bank,
2013). According to the human capital theory, we would expect rising educational attain-
ment of women over time. This is also observed in the dataset. Women in Nicaragua show
higher level of education since the 90s (Enamorado, Izaguirre and N˜opo, 2009). For 2005
and 2009 working women in urban area have on average 9.23 and 9.52 years of education,
while working men have on average 8.62 and 8.97 respectively. This picture is similar
across the wage distribution for 2005, although for 2009 women have greater educational
attainment at the top half of the distribution (see figure 2).
Moreover, since women tend to devote more time to family (child-bearing and child-
caring), they are more likely to withdraw temporarily from the labor force or work less
hours. Therefore, accumulation of experience tend to be lower for women compared to
men. In fact, this is observed by looking at data on occupational tenure for 2005.16 On
16This data is not available for the 2009 EMNV survey.
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average, men stay within the same occupation for 6.8 years while women stay it for 6.1
years (see table 7 in appendix). This difference is wider at the bottom and the top of the
wage distribution (see figure 3). This might suggest that differences in job-training might
explain part of the wage gap by gender at different points of the distribution.
Figure 2: Educational Attainment Across the Wage Distribution
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
Figure 3: Occupational Tenure in 2005 Across the Wage Distribution
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3.1.2 Occupational Gender Segregation
Occupational segregation might appear due to different factors. One is related to the
human capital model. Polachek (1985) points out that since women are more likely to
be out of the labor force at different points of the life-cycle, they will choose occupations
with less barriers to access; usually these occupations demand lower skills and have smaller
returns to job-training. In competitive labor markets, “overcrowded” sectors by females
will pay lower wages. In contrast, “male occupations” will be less competitive and thus
wages will be higher (Bergmann, 1974).
Differences in preferences have also been considered as a source of gender occupational
segregation. If women are willing to work in a pleasant job environment and are averse
to work in certain occupations, while men are not averse to work in risky jobs, then there
may be a wage premium for men. This is known as the compensating differentials model
(Anker, 1997). Altonji and Blank (1999) stresses that it is difficult to identify the roots of
the preferences by gender. This could be due to cultural and social processes or as a result
of discrimination. Nevertheless, differences in wages due to occupational segregation are
easy to identify (Blau and Kahn, 2000).
Other scholars view occupational segregation as a result of “stereotypes”. Gender
theories state that women are seen as subordinates and linked roles related to family
care (Anker, 1997). Therefore, they tend to be located in occupations that demand
lower human capital. For example, it has been shown that domestic help in Nicaragua
is an occupation performed exclusively by women. Women are trained on this type of
occupation since a young age as they devote time for household care. This is a result of
the labor division at home (Agurto et al. 2008; Tinoco and Agurto, 2003). Furthermore,
this theory can be related with the models of discrimination, which are discussed next.
3.2 Wage Structure Effect
The gender wage gap is not only determined by differences in observed characteristics,
but also by the returns to these characteristics. In applied economics, researchers have
analyzed this issue under the assumption of equality in endowment between groups. This
is known as the wage structure effect and is analyzed based on theories of discrimination
(see second term in equation (4)). Based on Altonji and Blank (1999), gender discrim-
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ination can be defined as the unequal treatment (different wages) to women with the
same productive characteristics as men. There are several views about discrimination,
but in our study we consider the following as the more suitable to the Nicaraguan con-
text: taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971), statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972;
Arrow, 1973) and occupational segregation due to discrimination.
Becker’s (1971) theory states that discrimination arises from the “taste for discrimina-
tion” by consumers, workers and employers. The latter has received more attention in the
context of the gender wage gap (Tenjo, Ribero and Bernat, 2005). In this model employ-
ers discriminate a minority group (women), therefore, they are willing to pay less wages
to women even if they share the same productive characteristics as men (Cain, 1986).
Becker’s model also predicts that in competitive markets non-discriminatory firms would
have higher profits than discriminatory firms and eventually would be out of the market.
This would imply a reduction in the wage gap, although Altonji and Blank (1999) stress
that this is not what has been observed in the empirical literature. Furthermore, it has
been argued that in non-competitive markets it is possible that the taste for discrimination
will be persistent. This could be the case for example in the presence of monopolies and
under imperfect information (Cain, 1986). Regarding the latter, this model states that
women face greater search cost in markets where there is imperfect information about the
employer’s taste for discrimination. This will reduce women’s wage reservation relative
to men and therefore their wages will be lower (see Black, 1995).
As an alternative to Becker’s theories, the statistical discrimination model was pro-
posed by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973). This framework states that differences in wages
result from employers’ discrimination based on judgements (prior beliefs) or the expected
productivity of men and women. In presence of imperfect information, employers rely on
stereotypes or on average information of individuals’ productivity in order to determine
wages (Aigner and Cain, 1977). Statistical discrimination is difficult to test in practice,
as the way in which employers form their expectations is uncertain and statistical dis-
crimination might also be confused with taste-based discrimination (Altonji and Blank,
1999). Nevertheless, some scholars have found evidence of statistical discrimination using
decomposition methods (see e.g. Tenjo, Ribero and Bernat, 2005).
Finally, a framework that has drawn attention is occupational segregation due to dis-
crimination. According to Altonji and Blank (1999), overcrowded occupations by females
14
are due to social processes, institutional restrictions and employer’s discrimination. How-
ever, social processes might also be shaped by pre-market discrimination. For example,
the educational system or the family can influence women’s preferences by raising them
based on discriminatory beliefs regarding the role of women in economic activities (Al-
tonji and Blank, 1999). Meanwhile, both the taste for discrimination and stereotypes
might determine employer’s discrimination. This subject has been largely debated among
scholars, as segregation may be influenced not only by non-cognitive skills, ability and
preferences but also by different forms of discrimination (Antecol and Cobb-Clark, 2010).
This issue challenges the precision of the attempts to measure the level of discrimination
that women suffer by using decomposition methods.
Despite the difficulties to differentiate among different types of discrimination, it is
possible to identify from the data for urban Nicaragua some level of discrimination in
a broad sense. For example, looking at the earnings profiles over the life-cycle, proxied
by potential experience, we observe an inverted U shaped pattern as the human capital
model predicts (see figure 4).17 More importantly, the wage structure at the same level
of experience is higher for men in almost all stages of the life-cycle for 2005, especially
from 20 years onwards. In contrast, these gaps seem to have narrowed for 2009, which
may suggest a reduction of discriminatory levels.
Figure 4: Returns to Experience
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
The picture is quite similar by exploring the returns at the same level of education (see
figure 5). For 2005, returns to education are greater for men up to university levels. This
17Potential experience is constructed as age minus years of education minus six.
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suggests that there might not be an unequal treatment at postgraduate level. Meanwhile,
the differences in payments are marginal for 2009.
Figure 5: Returns to Schooling
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4 Data
The data used in this study come from the National Household Living Standards Sur-
vey (EMNV) for 2005 and 2009 conducted by the National Institute for Development
Information (INIDE) of Nicaragua.18 The EMNV surveys include a random sample with
national coverage and provide cross-sectional information on household consumption, in-
come and poverty.19 The design of the survey is based on the methodology developed
by the World Bank under the project Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS).20
Despite some minor divergence in the questionnaires, both surveys should be compatible
and comparisons over time can be derived using a set of harmonized variables.
The datasets contain information for 36,612 individuals from 6,882 households for
2005 and 30,432 individuals from 6,515 households for 2009. Information is available on
the characteristics of the individuals such as sex, age, region (Managua, Pacific, Central,
Atlantic), area of residence, civil status and educational attainment. Moreover, it is
18Encuesta de Hogares sobre Medicio´n del Nivel de Vida.
19We use the sampling expansion factor of each survey in order to represent the working and non-
working population of the country.
205 surveys have been undertaken for the years 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2009.
16
possible to compute household characteristics such as number of persons living in the
household, number of children younger than 14 years old and number of persons employed.
Data on labor market characteristics includes information on the numbers of hours worked,
labor income and number of individuals by occupational category, economic sector and
occupational classes.
We restrict our analysis to the urban area. We adopt this approach because analyzing
urban and rural areas as a whole might provide a misleading view of the gender wage
gap in Nicaragua. This could be because labor market characteristics in rural area differ
from the urban in terms of productivity and remuneration. Furthermore, employment is
different in the rural area as it depends to some extent on the harvest season.
By focusing on the population in urban areas we obtain information for 17,287 and
21,698 individuals for 2005 and 2009, respectively. We restrict the analysis to individ-
uals between ages 14 and 65 years old in order to avoid the influence of education and
retirement choices in labor market participation (Beblo, Beninger, Heinze and Laisney,
2003). Unpaid family and non-family workers and disabled individuals are also excluded.
Moreover, while in previous research a minimum age for work of 10 or 11 years has been
used (see e.g. Monrroy, 2008; Agurto et al. 2008), we use the minimum age of 14 years
old established in the Code of Childhood and Adolescence and by the Ministry of labor.21
We do this because less than 2.0% of the children between ages 10-13 in both samples
are working. This implies that most of these children are full-time students and their
selection into labor market may be different from the rest of the individuals in the sam-
ple. Finally, individuals from which there is any missing value in the variables used in
the analysis are excluded. The final sample for 2005 includes 3437 working men, 2551
working women, 1481 unemployed men and 3238 unemployed women. Meanwhile, the
sample for 2009 covers 4421 working men, 3545 working women, 2193 unemployed men
and 4036 unemployed women.
Working individuals are classified as those who reported positive hours and earnings.22
Wages are computed using the labor income from the primary occupation. Earnings are
reported in several frequencies (daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, quarterly, semester and
annual). Therefore we standardize the data to a weekly frequency as the survey show
21Co´digo de la Nin˜ez y la Adolescencia (Law No. 287) and Ministerial Agreement JCHG-010-06-07
approved on May 23, 2007 by the Minister of labor of Nicaragua.
22Observations with outliers in hours and earnings are also excluded.
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information on the usual hours worked per week.23 Hourly wages are then obtained
by dividing wages by the number of hours worked. In order to allow for comparability
between the 2005 and 2009 surveys nominal hourly wages are transformed to constant
values of 2005 using the national consumer price index (CPI).24
Figure 6: Kernel Densities of Log Real Wages per Hour
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
Figure 6 shows the Kernel density estimates of the logarithm of real wages per hour for
2005 and 2009. Looking at these plots we get a preliminary view of the raw gender wage
gap. In overall, the distribution of hourly wages by sex is different in both years. Men’s
wage density is skewed to the right, especially for 2009. Moreover, the gaps do not seem
to be constant across the distribution over the period of study. For 2005, the gap looks
greater at the bottom of the wage distribution, but there is also a marked gap at the top.
For 2009, the gaps are greater at the bottom and at the middle of the distribution but is
marginal at the top. These figures give support to the idea of exploring the determinants
of these gaps across the distribution rather than exclusively at the mean.
Educational attainment is constructed based on the educational level and last year
succeeded reported in the survey. Complete primary education is 6 years and complete
23Based on Ahmed and Maitra (2010), the daily wage is converted to a weekly frequency assuming
that individuals work 6 days during the week. Furthermore, we assume that there are 4.3 working weeks
per month.
24The CPI published by the Central Bank of Nicaragua is in base year 2006=100, thus the index is
transformed to a base year 2005=100.
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secondary is 5 years. Technical (vocational) education includes basic, middle, superior
and teacher training. Tertiary education includes college, master and doctorate level. We
exclude individuals with special education. Based on this criteria we construct 4 dummy
variables: none or primary incomplete; primary complete or secondary incomplete; sec-
ondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; and tertiary and technical complete.
In this way, we capture potential non-linearities in the returns to education.
Potential experience is approximated in the traditional way: experience = age - years
of education - 6. The number of years of education is not reported in the survey and
there is no official publication - at least to the best of our knowledge - that established
the minimum required of years of education to access different stages of educational level.
Taking into account this limitation, we estimate the years of education by assuming that
the minimum required to access to secondary education and teacher training is 7 years
of education, basic technical education is at least 8 years, middle technical education
is 9 years, superior technical education and university is 12 years, master degree is 17
years and doctorate level 19 years. Meanwhile, at age 6 children are supposed to start
attending school. Potential experience is modelled as dummy variables that capture
experience groups. A valid concern regarding this variable is that it tends to overstate
the experience; it does not account periods in which individuals are absent from the labor
market. This overstatement tend to be greater for women as they are more likely to
temporarily withdraw from the labor market due to child caring (Arends, 1992; Scott,
1992). This is in agreement with the graphical inspection performed in figure 3.
Another variable that captures working experience is occupational tenure. This infor-
mation is available for the 2005 survey but not for 2009. Therefore, we chose to explore
the role of occupational tenure for 2005 instead of potential experience and we discuss
how the results are sensitive to the inclusion of this variable. It is worthy to emphasize
that potential experience and occupational tenure do not account for the same effect, as
the latter does not necessarily capture experience during the life cycle.25
Several dummy variables were constructed in order to capture job-related characteris-
tics. Occupational category is divided in self-employed, employee and employer. Economic
activity classes are constructed using the Standard Classification of Economic Activities of
25N˜opo and Hoyos (2010) explore the role of job tenure for six Latin American countries as a whole
(including Nicaragua) for the early 90s and middle 2000.
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Nicaragua, which is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities (ISIC) published by the United Nations. Meanwhile, occupations
classes are constructed using the Standard Classification of Occupations of Nicaragua
which is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO - 88)
published by the International labor Organization (ILO).
We address selectivity in participation using Heckman’s correction (1979) and by an-
alyzing the decision of entering into the labor market. There is no consensus on how
to classify the labor market participation. Beblo et al. (2003) exclude unemployed in-
dividuals as they show different characteristics from those individuals “voluntarily not
employed”. In contrast, other scholars state that an individual participates in the labor
force if he/she is working, searching for a job or temporarily unemployed (see e.g. Ng,
1992). In this study, we chose to follow both approaches and we discuss the sensitivity of
the results to a different definition of labor market participation.26
The validity of Heckman’s method lies on satisfying the exclusion restriction. This
consists of the selection of appropriate instruments for the equation of participation in
the labor market. Basically, valid instruments are those variables that influence the
participation decision but not the “offered wage” (Puhani, 2000). In practice, it is difficult
to choose appropriate instruments for the Heckman’s procedure. Ahmed and Maitra
(2010) underline that identification of the instruments usually lies on intuition and data
availability.
Taking into account this issue in this paper we chose 5 variables: age groups (5-year
intervals) in order to capture non-linearities in the probability of participating in the
labor force; a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is married and
zero otherwise (single, divorced and widowers); the “need for income” is measured by the
number of persons living in the household, number of children younger than 14 years old
and number of persons employed excluding the respondent.27
Labor market characteristics by gender are presented in tables 5 and 6 in appendix and
job-related characteristics are reported in table 7 in appendix. Moreover, table 1 shows
that females’ wages represent 79% and 87% of males wage rate in urban Nicaragua for 2005
26In practice, the difference between both approaches is given by excluding unemployed individuals
from the sample.
27In this definition we consider as married those people that reported to be married or cohabitating.
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and 2009, respectively. Although these figures show that there have been improvements
towards gender equity on average, in overall women have lower wages compared to men
among different groups (see table 1).
Looking at different groups we observe various patterns in the gender wage gap. For
example, greater gaps appear among self-employed and employers compared to employees.
The ratio female-to-male wages is higher in Managua (capital city) compared to the rest
of the regions. In addition, men tend to earn more than women in all educational levels
and almost in all age groups.28 By economic sector, we observe greater gaps in the
industrial and service sectors compared to the commerce activities. By occupational
classes, women’s wages tend to be higher than men among non-skill workers, while we
find the opposite case among the rest of occupations analyzed. These figures suggest
marked differences in the wage gap across the distribution. Furthermore, between 2005
and 2009 we observe a reduction in the mean wage differences in almost all the groups
analyzed.
28Exceptions are found in ages 14-24 for 2005 and ages 30-34 and 55-59 for 2009.
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Table 1: Gender Wage Gap in Urban Nicaragua, 2005-2009
Real Hourly Wages (2005 C$)
2005 2009
Male Female F/M Male Female F/M
All 15.21 12.01 0.79 15.51 13.54 0.87
Age group (%)
Age 14 to 24 8.85 8.96 1.01 10.26 9.38 0.91
Age 25 to 29 14.77 11.18 0.76 16.01 12.63 0.79
Age 30 to 34 15.11 11.73 0.78 14.26 14.92 1.05
Age 35 to 39 17.05 14.80 0.87 17.89 14.48 0.81
Age 40 to 44 17.87 14.73 0.82 19.58 14.56 0.74
Age 45 to 49 22.45 12.97 0.58 20.77 18.01 0.87
Age 50 to 54 30.09 11.09 0.37 18.34 13.77 0.75
Age 55 to 59 16.26 12.84 0.79 12.28 14.11 1.15
Age 60 to 65 12.02 10.50 0.87 17.77 10.31 0.58
Education levels (%)
None or Primary Incomplete 9.52 7.84 0.82 11.34 9.42 0.83
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete 12.71 10.03 0.79 13.06 10.07 0.77
Secondary Complete, Tertiary or Technical Incomp. 13.50 10.88 0.81 16.16 13.69 0.85
Tertiary and Technical Complete 39.06 24.13 0.62 30.03 24.19 0.81
Region (%)
Managua 15.83 14.75 0.93 15.70 14.80 0.94
Pacific 14.58 10.48 0.72 15.61 13.07 0.84
Central 14.75 9.16 0.62 14.72 10.85 0.74
Atlantic 15.57 11.52 0.74 16.25 15.86 0.98
Occupational category (%)
Employee 12.57 11.74 0.93 13.44 13.12 0.98
Self-employed 13.96 10.61 0.76 18.43 13.85 0.75
Employer 46.70 30.14 0.65 39.51 33.58 0.85
Economic sector (%)
Industry 14.02 9.57 0.68 12.79 10.37 0.81
Commerce 14.01 11.91 0.85 14.42 13.75 0.95
Service 17.91 13.25 0.74 19.66 14.51 0.74
Occupation classes (%)
Non-skill workers 8.47 8.83 1.04 9.20 9.41 1.02
Professional, Technical and Managerial 29.56 22.24 0.75 28.71 23.60 0.82
Sales and Clerical 13.95 9.85 0.71 14.87 12.25 0.82
Operational and Services Workers 15.40 8.76 0.57 14.76 10.88 0.74
Note: The wage gap in each category is computed as the ratio of females mean wage over males mean wage (F/M).
Real hourly wages are in Co´rdobas at 2005 prices.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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5 Empirical Strategy
We rely on regression-based decomposition methods in order to study the difference in
wages by gender. This approach has been widely used in applied economics and it has
been extended in several ways in order to look at the difference in the distribution rather
than only mean outcomes (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2010).
In this paper it is applied the Oaxaca-Blinder method (hereafter OB) in order to
perform a detailed decomposition of the mean wage gap. The decomposition is also
corrected for potential sample selection bias in the way suggested by Heckman (1979).
Furthermore, we use the Recentered Influence Function regression (hereafter RIF method)
proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), which allow us to compute the contribution
of each factor at different percentiles.
5.1 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
In the OB method, equation (2) is the starting point,29
Yi = Xiβi + εi (5)
where Y is ln(w). i ∈ {A,B}, A corresponds to males and B represents the females
group. X is a vector of observable individual characteristics and β includes the inter-
cept and the coefficients of the covariates. ε is an error term that included unobserved
characteristics and is assumed to be independent of the covariates (E[εi|Xi] = 0).
From equation (5), we can compute the mean difference in wages as follows,
E(YA − YB) = E(XA)βA − E(XB)βB (6)
Then, we add and subtract the counterfactual βAXB, which is the average wage that
group B (females) would have if they had the same return as group A (males). Thus,
equation (6) can be rearranged as follows,
E(YA − YB) = E(XA)βA − E(XB)βA + E(XB)βA − E(XB)βB
29This section is based on Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010) and Jann (2008).
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E(YA − YB) = [E(XA)− E(XB)]βA + E(XB)[βA − βB] (7)
The components of the decomposition can be estimated by least squares or another
estimator,
Y¯A − Y¯B = (X¯A − X¯B)βˆA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained part
+ X¯B(βˆA − βˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained part
(8)
where X¯ represents the mean of the covariates and βˆ is the estimated coefficient of
β. The first term corresponds to the composition effect, which measures differences in
the observed characteristics between males and females. The second term represents the
wage structure effect, which accounts for the difference in the returns between males
and women, under assumption that they have the same characteristics. Although this
component is referred to as the difference due to discrimination, it also includes the effect
of unobserved characteristics such as innate ability and non-cognitive skills (Fortin, 2008).
As can be noticed, in equation (8) we have chosen females as the discriminated group.
In this specification it is assumed that there is no positive discrimination towards men.
However, as Oaxaca (1973) has pointed out, the decomposition of the wage gap is sensitive
to the choice of reference group. This is known as the “index number problem”. Several
scholars have proposed different alternatives to deal with this problem.
One of these alternatives is using weighted coefficients (see e.g. Reimers, 1983; Cotton,
1988; Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994; Fortin, 2008),
β∗ = ΩβA + (I − Ω)βB (9)
where β∗ corresponds to the non-discriminatory coefficient, Ω is a matrix of relative
weights and I is an identity matrix (Jann, 2008). The specification in equation (8) is equal
to set Ω = I. Meanwhile, Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) proposed the following weighting
matrix,
β∗ = Ω = (X ′AXA +X
′
BXB)
−1X ′AXA (10)
where XA and XB correspond to the values of the characteristics of group A (males)
and B (females). Equation (10) corresponds to the coefficients from a pooled regression
for the two samples (A and B), which is an approach that has also been proposed by
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Neumark (1988). Based on this framework, the decomposition can be expressed as,
Y¯A − Y¯B = (X¯A − X¯B)β∗ + X¯A(βˆA − β∗) + X¯B(β∗ − βˆB) (11)
Moreover, we add to the pooled model a dummy variable that identifies the sex of the
individuals. According to Fortin (2008), in this way the potential bias is avoided, which
arises from the “group membership effect”. This is because coefficients from the pooled
model capture part of the unexplained differences by gender, overstating the results of
the decomposition. Thus, the pooled model is given by,
Yi = Xiγ + FiγB +MiγA + εi (12)
where Fi and Mi are the female and male dummy, respectively. Moreover, in equation
(12) it is applied the restriction γB +γA = 0. As stated in Fortin (2008), this implies that
the advantage of men is equivalent to the disadvantage of women.
Using this procedure the decomposition can be written as follows,
Y¯A − Y¯B = (X¯A − X¯B)γˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained part
+ [X¯A(βˆA − γˆ)− X¯B(βˆB − γˆ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained part
(13)
where γˆ is the non-discriminatory wage structure.
In our study we consider the specifications stated in equations (8) and (13). In equation
(8), females are assumed to be the discriminated group and the second one corresponds
to the coefficients from the pooled model. Another alternative would be to consider
positive discrimination towards men. However, this would imply setting the females’
wage structure as the non-discriminatory group, which is not suitable in the context of
Nicaragua based on previous evidence.30
The detailed decomposition is straightforward to compute because the total explained
part is the sum of the contribution of each factor. Therefore, we can rewrite the first term
30Agurto et al. (2008) study different forms in which women are in disadvantage compared to men,
especially regarding their role in the reproductive and productive activities.
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in equation (8) as follows,31
(X¯A − X¯B)βˆA = (X¯1A − X¯1B)βˆ1A + (X¯2A − X¯2B)βˆ2A + ... =
K∑
k=1
(X¯kA − X¯kB)βˆkA (14)
where k = 1, 2, ..., K.
In the same way we can obtain the contribution of each factor in the unexplained part,
X¯B(βˆA − βˆB) = (βˆ0A − βˆ0B) + X¯1B(βˆ1A − βˆ1B) + X¯2B(βˆ2A − βˆ2B) + ...
(βˆ0A − βˆ0B) +
K∑
k=1
X¯kB(βˆkA − βˆkB) (15)
Finally, as discussed by several scholars (see e.g. Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999; Fortin,
Lemieux and Firpo, 2010), the detailed decomposition of the wage structure is sensitive
to the choice of the omitted group for the case of categorical variables. In this regard,
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010) suggest the choice of a base group that provides a good
economic interpretation rather than a “arbitrary normalization”. Thus, based on this
recommendation, each dummy variable is interpreted as the effect of a category relative
to the base group.
5.2 Heckman’s Correction for Sample Selection
One of the potential drawbacks in the standard OB decomposition is the non-random
sample selection. There are different ways of addressing selectivity in participation. Some
authors consider selectivity into occupational categories like employee or self-employed
(see e.g. Stelcner, Smith, Breslaw and Monette, 1992). Meanwhile, others look at the
decision of entering into the labor market (see e.g. Ahmed and Maitra, 2010; Beblo et al.
2003; Yang, 1992; Arends, 1992). In this study we focus on the latter.
Selection bias in participation appears if the characteristics of the working individuals
considered in the sample are different from those who do not participate in the labor force
or are unemployed (Vella, 1998). In this case, working individuals will not represent a
random sample of the population of interest. Therefore, if the decision of participation in
the labor market is correlated with the wage rate and some of the covariates (e.g. expe-
31This expression can be written in the same way for the decomposition in equation (13).
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rience), the zero conditional mean assumption is violated. Consequently, the regression
coefficients will be biased and will overstate effects like the returns to skills (Beblo et al.
2003).
The most popular approach to deal with this problem has been the one proposed by
Heckman (1979), although alternative methods are provided in Dolton and Makepeace
(1986) and Lewbel (2007). Beblo et al. (2003) point out that correcting for sample
selection can be done in different ways depending on the problem of interest and the
nature of the data. In our case study, the two-step procedure proposed by Heckman
(1979) is used, as we are interested in assessing the net wage gap after accounting for
selection effects and how the components of the decomposition have changed. In the
first step, a participating equation is estimated. This is computed as the probability
that the individual participates in the labor market conditional on a vector of observable
characteristics. In the second step, we include the inverse Mills ratio as an additional
covariate in order to control for potential selection bias (Heckman, 1979).
The selection equation is given by,
Pi = αZi + µi (16)
where P is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual participates in the
labor market and 0 otherwise (based on the definitions stated in section 4). i ∈ {A,B},
where A is male and B is female. Z is a vector of observable individual characteristics
that determine the participation. α represents the coefficients of the parameters of inter-
est. The error term is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d [0, 1]). We estimate
equation (16) using a probit estimator separately for men and women.
Then, the inverse Mills ratio is obtained as λi =
φ(−αZi)
1−Φ(−αZi) , where φ and Φ correspond
to the normal density and normal distribution functions, respectively. Next, we include
λ as an additional regressor into equation (5),
Yi = Xiβi + ρλi + εi (17)
where ρ represents the correlation between the wage regression and the selection equa-
tion. We test for selection bias by looking at the t-test of the coefficient of λ. If the coeffi-
27
cient is statistically significant it is argued that there is presence of selectivity (Heckman,
1979). Moreover, we choose not to establish an expected sign for the selection of women
and men.
Despite the wide applicability of Heckman’s correction method in many empirical
studies, there are some concerns about the robustness of the results provided by this
estimator.32 We focus on two particular issues that have relevance in the context of
decomposition methods. Firstly, including the inverse Mills ratio as an additional covari-
ate might produce multicollinearity in the results, which can lead to large standard errors
(Puhani, 2000). Collinearity may appear when the variables used in the selection equation
are the same as the ones used in the wage regression. Puhani (2000) suggests incorpo-
rating exclusion restrictions as a potential solution to diminish collinearity. In practice,
this is done by including in the first step variables that influence the participation deci-
sion but not the “offered wage”. Thus, following this recommendation, we include these
variables as instruments: age groups, marital status, household size, number of children
within the household and number of working members in the household (excluding the
respondent).33 Furthermore, following Puhani (2000), we test for potential collinearity by
looking at the R-squared of a regression of the inverse Mills ratio on the covariates of the
wage regression.
A second concern is the sensitivity of the coefficient of λ to the specification of the
participation equation, which is also related to the validity of the instruments (Beblo et
al., 2003). Lauer and Steiner (2000) try to address this issue by testing the sensitivity
of the results to different specifications, although it is difficult to assert if the selected
instrument is good enough. Nevertheless, we follow this approach for the left-hand side
of the equation.
There are several ways to introduce the selection correction into the OB decompo-
sition.34 As mentioned before, we chose to compute the net wage gap. Therefore, the
32See Puhani (2000) for a depth discussion of the drawbacks of Heckman’s method.
33It is worth mentioning that by construction, age is strongly correlated to experience, but this is not
necessarily the case for the age groups and experience groups.
34A formal discussion on selectivity issues in decomposition methods can be found in Neuman and
Oaxaca (2004).
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selection term is introduced in equation (8) as follows,35
Y¯A − Y¯B = (X¯A − X¯B)βˆA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained part
+ X¯B(βˆA − βˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained part
+ (ρˆAλˆA − ρˆBλˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Difference in selectivity
(Y¯A − Y¯B) + (ρˆBλˆB − ρˆAλˆA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net difference
= (X¯A − X¯B)βˆA︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained part
+ X¯B(βˆA − βˆB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained part
(18)
The left hand side of equation (18) corresponds to the difference in wages net of
selection effects, which is also known as the “offered wage gap” (Beblo et al. 2003).
5.3 RIF Method
The RIF regression method proposed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) computes a
detailed composition for distributional statistics such as median, gini, variance, quantiles
and percentiles. The procedure provides unconditional quantile estimates, which are of
interest in applied economics (Chi and Li, 2008).
The procedure is divided in two steps. The first one consists of computing a recentered
influence function (RIF) for the quantile q(τ) and to use this variable instead of the
outcome of interest, i.e., wage (Y ). Following Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010), the RIF
is given by,36
RIF (y;Qτ ) = Qτ +
τ − 1{y 6 Qτ}
fY (Qτ )
(19)
where Qτ corresponds to the population in the τ -quantile, 1{} is the indicator function
of whether the wage observation (y) is at or under the quantile τ and fY () is the density
function of Y .
The RIF for each observation [R̂IF (Yi; Qˆτ )] is obtained by estimating the sample
quantile Qˆτ and computing the density fˆY (Qˆτ ) using a kernel estimation. Then, it is
estimated the effect of a change in the distribution of a given covariate on the marginal
quantile τ of Y (Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2009, pp. 957), in a specification that takes
the form,
E[RIF (Yi;Qτ )|Xi] = Xiβi (20)
35The adjusted decomposition can be written in the same way for the specification that uses the
coefficients from a pooled model (see equation (13)).
36Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) define the RIF as RIF (y; v) = v(FY ) + IF (y; v), which adding
the quantile back can be also expressed as
∫
RIF (y; v)  dF (y) = v(FY ), where IF (y; v) is the influence
function of the observation y for the quantile v(FY ).
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The parameters of interest (β) can be estimated by OLS or any other estimator,37
R̂IF (Yi; Qˆτ ) = Xiβˆi for i = A,B (21)
where βˆ captures the “unconditional quantile partial effect” of X.38
Using the estimates from equation (21) we can compute an OB decomposition for each
unconditional quantile as follows,
Qˆτ (YA)− Qˆτ (YB) = (X¯A − X¯B)βˆA,τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Explained part
+ X¯B(βˆA,τ − βˆB,τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unexplained part
(22)
As in the OB decomposition, the first term is the composition effect and the second one
is the wage structure effect. In this specification, females are assumed to be the discrimi-
nated group. We do not computed the decomposition using the coefficients from a pooled
model. We chose this specification because we expect our results to serve as a baseline for
future research, in which a reweighting approach combined with the RIF method can be
computed in the way suggested by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010). In the reweighting
approach, the counterfactual for the distribution of women wages is constructed based on
what the distribution would be if women possess the same distributional characteristics
of men (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2010).
We can get the contribution of each factor in the same way that in the OB method
(see equations (14) and (15)). The standard errors for the decomposition are computed
using bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. Finally, for the detailed decom-
position we mainly focus on the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles.
According to Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010), one of the advantages of the RIF
regression is that the decomposition is path independent, as the inversion of the propor-
tions back to quantiles is done locally. In this way, it is straightforward to compute and
interpret decompositions at specific points of the distribution. They also point out that
the main concern with this approach is regarding the precision of the linear approximation
of the decomposition.
37Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) suggest three methods: OLS, logistic estimator and a non-
parametric estimator.
38The rest of the subscripts are indicated as in the previous sub-sections.
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5.4 The Wage Equation and Issues in Decomposition Methods
Decomposition methods provide a good understanding of the contribution of several fac-
tors to the differences in wages by gender. Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010) stress that
the wage structure effect, under certain assumptions, can reflect treatment effects in the
spirit of the impact evaluation framework’s. Nevertheless, they also point out that these
methods only provide descriptive results of the differences in the labor market and it is
difficult to derive structural relations and obtain causal estimates from them. In prac-
tice, the assumption E[εi|Xi] = 0 is not likely to hold, thus Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo
(2010) assume “ignorability”, which basically states that the decomposition is valid if the
bias is the same for males and females. Moreover, even when we account for potential
sample selection bias at the mean, this is not done for the case of quantiles. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no methodology yet that controls for sample selection in de-
tailed decompositions for quantiles. Therefore, considering these issues, the results of the
decompositions should be interpreted with cautious.
Based on the discussion in section 3, the covariates included in the wage equation are
4 dummies of schooling, potential experience and its squared value, regional dummies
(Managua, Central, Pacific and Atlantic), dummies of occupational category (employee,
self-employed and employer), 4 dummies of occupational classes and 3 dummies of eco-
nomic sectors. The reference category is secondary complete, tertiary or technical incom-
plete for the educational groups; Pacific and Atlantic regions for the regional dummies;
employee for occupational category; operational and services workers for the occupational
classes; and industry for the economic sectors.
In section 4, we addressed some of the practical problems that appear in the available
data. However, other concerns arise in the specification of the wage regression. According
to Blau and Kahn (2000), it is difficult to measure the actual effect of discrimination, as
unobserved factors such as innate ability are not accounted in the estimation. In this re-
gard, the discrimination level resulted from the decomposition would be overstated if men
have greater ability than women. In contrast, as noticed by Oaxaca (1973), controlling
for occupational classes and economic sector might provide an understated measure of
discrimination if gender segregation is the result of discriminatory practices in the labor
market. This would also be the case if women suffer from barriers to access and have
greater ability than men (Blau and Kahn, 2000). Aware of this issue, we discuss whether
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the discrimination is being understated in our results based on the effects of occupational
categories.
6 Which Factors Explain the Gender Wage Gap?
6.1 Determinants of Labor Market Participation
Selection into the labor market is estimated using a probit model. The regressions are
computed separately for men and women in each year. We specify the model taking into
account the availability of information for both surveys (2005 and 2009) and previous
evidence for Latin American countries (see e.g. Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos, 1992).
As mentioned previously, we use two variables as measures of labor market participation.
The first one is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is working and
zero if is voluntarily unemployed (definition 1 ). The second one takes the value 1 if the
individual is working, searching for a job or temporarily unemployed and zero otherwise
(definition 2 ). As explanatory variables we chose two demographic variables: age (groups)
and marital status. The variables that capture the need for income are household size,
number of children and number of working members in the household (excluding the
respondent). Finally, the effect of human capital on the labor supply is measured through
schooling dummies.
Urban labor market characteristics are reported in tables 5 and 6 in appendix. A large
share of the unemployed individuals (voluntary and non-voluntary) is in the age group 14-
24 years old. In addition, more than two third of the voluntarily unemployed individuals
are women. This is not surprising as women tend to withdraw from the labor force at the
different points of the life-cycle due to child-bearing and child-caring (Polachek, 2004).
Furthermore, working and temporarily unemployed women are more educated than men;
voluntarily unemployed men show higher schooling than women in this category.
Table 2 shows the marginal effects of the probit estimations for females and males.
Educational attainment is found to be an important determinant in female participation.
Having a degree lower than complete secondary (reference category) reduces the probabil-
ity of participation between 12-23 percentage points. Meanwhile, females with technical
(incomplete) and tertiary education have higher probability of participation (15-24 per-
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centage points). In contrast, greater educational attainment is not a key determinant of
male participation, although those men with secondary and tertiary incomplete education
have lower probability of participation compared to individuals with complete secondary.
These effects are large and statistically significant at conventional levels.
Regarding the effect of age, the probability of participation for females and males shows
a concave shaped. Those individuals in ages 14-24 and 60-65 have a lower probability of
participation compared to individuals in ages 25-29 (reference category). Also, it is worth
noticing that probability of participating for females increase by ageing. Furthermore, as
has been shown by the literature, being married reduces the probability of participation
(14-17 percentage points) of females compared to those non-married. In contrast, married
males are more likely to participate (9-12 percentage points) than non-married males.
These results suggest a labor division within the household, in which women are more
likely to devote their time towards household production than men (Agurto et al. 2008).
The variables that capture the effects of the need for income are statistically significant.
Higher number of individuals in the household reduces the probability of participation for
males and females, being this effect higher for women (6-15 percentage points). The
more the household workers, the higher the probability of participation for females (19-34
percentage points), while this effects is very low for males (3-6 percentage points). In
addition, a higher number of children increase the probability of participation for males
and females, although this effect is larger for women (11-15 percentage points) compared
to men (2 percentage points). The fact that more children and household workers increase
the probability of participation of females is an evidence of substitution in household work.
According to Agurto et al. (2008), female children perform a large share of household
tasks. This might suggest that adult women assign household activities to young children
in order to work (or search for a job) and supply more financial resources to the household.
From these results we can draw some conclusions. Firstly, the estimations are quite
similar using both definitions of labor market participation. Moreover, the sign and
statistical significance of the marginal effects are almost analogous for 2005 and 2009.
Secondly, the need for income seems to be more important in female’s probability of
participation compared to men. Finally, age and education appear to be key determinants
of labor participation of both groups.
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6.2 The Wage Regression: Unadjusted versus Adjusted
The OLS wage regressions are reported in table 3, while the regressions adjusted for
selection are reported in table 8 in appendix. As expected, the relation between wages
and educational attainment is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Having
no instruction, primary incomplete, primary complete or secondary incomplete reduces
wages compared to those who have secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete
(reference category). Moreover, wage rates increase for those individuals with complete
tertiary or technical education. The estimated returns to education are greater for men
in 2005, but for 2009 this gap has narrowed considerably. This result is consistent with
the graphical inspection performed in section 3.2 (see figure 5).
Experience and its squared value are statistically significant at the 1% level. Returns
to (potential) experience has a concave shape, as was also observed in figure 4. Men tend
to receive higher wage rates until 30-31 years, while women increase their wages up to
29 years (holding other factors fixed). As is shown in figure 7, returns to experience are
higher for men than women in 2005 and 2009. Also, returns for both sex have diminished
for 2009, especially for men.
Figure 7: Cumulative Returns to Potential Experience, 2005-2009
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
Regarding the variables that capture job-related characteristics it is observed that
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self-employed and employers have higher wages compared to employee (reference group).
This effect is statistically significant at conventional levels for both sex in 2005 and 2009,
except for self-employed men in 2005. In addition, returns are greater for employers
compared to the rest of job categories as expected. Working in professional, technical and
managerial occupations increases wages compared to operational and services workers
(reference group). The opposite is observed among non-skill workers, who show lower
wages compared to the base group (except for women in 2005). Individuals who work
in commercial activities do not have different wages compared to those who work in the
industrial sector, except for males in 2009 (reference group). Meanwhile, males working
in service activities earn more than industrial workers.
At the regional level, wage rates are higher for those individuals living in Managua
(capital city) compared to those living in the Pacific and Atlantic regions (reference cate-
gory). This effect is statistically significant at conventional level. Furthermore, individuals
living the central region have lower wage rates compared the Pacific and Atlantic workers,
except for men in 2009.
There is no a clear presence of selection bias. The effect of λ on the wage rate for both
males and females is not statistically different from zero for either of the definitions used
in the selection equations, except for males in 2005 using definition 1 (see column 1 of
table 8 in appendix). For this reason the adjusted coefficients of the regressions in table
8 appendix are almost the same to the unadjusted coefficients (see table 3). In order to
test for potential collinearity in the Heckman’s models, we regress the inverse Mills ratio
on the explanatory variables of the wage equation. We observe that the R-squared of
these regressions lies between 0.24-0.38, which is not high in order to suspect that there
is presence of collinearity in the estimations.39 Moreover, for the case of males in 2005
(using definition 1 ) a negative and statistically significant (at 10% level) coefficient of λ
implies that men selected into employment have a lower wage compared to men from a
random sample. For the case of females, the statistically insignificant coefficient suggests
that there is no difference in wages between women selected into employment and those
from a random sample of a population.
These results underline that the characteristics of the individuals that are out of the
labor market might be not so different from those who are working, i.e., there is no
39The output is not reported as these estimations are only exploratory.
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selectivity bias. We interpret these results with cautious because as was discussed before,
Heckman’s method is sensitive to model specification. Also selection into job-categories
could be playing a more important role compared to the decision of working (or search
for a job). Nevertheless, this issue goes beyond the scope of our work. Therefore, based
on the current evidence, we focus the analysis on the unadjusted OLS coefficients.
Table 3: OLS Wage Equations, 2005-2009
2005 2009
Males Females Males Females
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
None or Primary Incomplete -0.3585*** -0.4183*** -0.4121*** -0.3132***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete -0.1412*** -0.2579*** -0.2398*** -0.2103***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Tertiary and Technical Complete 0.5171*** 0.4441*** 0.2714*** 0.4430***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Experience 0.0311*** 0.0176*** 0.0241*** 0.0172***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Managua 0.2005*** 0.2066*** 0.0718** 0.0995***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Central -0.1012*** -0.1833*** 0.0328 -0.1906***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Self-employed 0.0509 0.2334*** 0.1167** 0.1688***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Employer 0.7303*** 0.9057*** 0.5894** 0.5788***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.24) (0.16)
Professional, Technical and Managerial 0.3430*** 0.5358*** 0.3581*** 0.3410***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Sales and Clerical -0.0722 -0.0927 -0.0118 -0.1663**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Non-Skill -0.1965*** 0.0774 -0.1830*** -0.2300***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
Commerce 0.0476 0.0288 0.0851* 0.0666
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Service 0.1098*** -0.0987 0.0866* 0.0627
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 1.8993*** 1.7761*** 2.1162*** 1.9963***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
R-squared 0.321 0.299 0.203 0.248
Sample size 3437 2551 4421 3545
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wages.
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
The reference categories are: secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; Pacific and Atlantic
regions; employee; operational and services workers; and industrial sector.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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6.3 Mean Wage Decomposition
In this section we discuss the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean.
Table 4 reports the aggregate decomposition of the mean wage gap uncorrected and
corrected for selectivity (using definition 1). As was mentioned in section 5, the dummy
variables are interpreted as the effect of a category relative to the base group. Taking
into account that there is evidence of negative selection for males in 2005, we only present
this adjusted decomposition. By comparing the unadjusted (columns 1-2) and adjusted
(columns 5-6) results for 2005, we can observe that the mean wage gap increases by
0.046 log points, as the offered wage rate is higher than the wage of the working men.
Nevertheless, the results of the decomposition do not change considerably. Therefore, we
focus on the unadjusted decomposition (columns 1-4).
Overall, the estimates show that all the wage gap is accounted by the wage structure
effect. This implies the presence of an “upper bound to discrimination”, as unobserved
characteristics like ability and non-cognitive factors could also play a role. The negative
sign of the composition effect shows that women have advantage in observed characteristics
compared to men. This is consistent with the graphical inspection in section 3.1.1. The
decompositions are similar using males as the reference group or the coefficients from a
pooled model.40 Moreover, these results confirm previous evidence on the explanations of
the mean wage gap for the case of Nicaragua.
The estimated mean wage is reduced by 0.0501 log points between 2005-2009. This
result is driven by a reduction in the wage structure effect of 0.035-0.016 log points.
Looking at the detailed decomposition in tables 9 and 10 in appendix is possible to analyze
which factor has more influence in the reduction of the wage gap during the period of
study. The composition effect (see table 9 in appendix) reflects a reduction in the wage
gap due to higher women’s endowments in terms of education (especially in complete
tertiary and technical education) and experience. Also, the effect of women’s endowment
in educational attainment slightly increases for 2009. Meanwhile, there are no apparent
differences in wages related to regional concentration of workers. Regarding job-related
characteristics, the differences in endowment of self-employed, professional, technical and
managerial occupations, and commerce and service activities have slightly contributed to
narrowing the gender wage gap, although this effect fell during 2005-2009.
40This result is also found in Fortin, Firpo and Lemieux (2010).
38
Furthermore, the wage structure effect (see table 10 in appendix) is mainly driven by
higher returns to experience to men. In fact, the reduction in the mean wage gap in the
period of study has been due to a reduction in the returns to this characteristic. How-
ever, the wage structure also provides interesting evidence of other effects. It is observed
that in 2005 self-employed women and those women working in professional, technical,
managerial, sales, clerical and non-skill occupations faced less discrimination compared
to the reference group (those with secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete
education, living in the Pacific or Atlantic regions, working as employee in operational
and services occupations in the industrial sector). However, for 2009 this situation has
changed, as those women working in sales, clerical and non-skill occupations face slightly
greater discrimination than the base group. Meanwhile, the wage gap attributed to dif-
ferent educational categories (in comparison with the reference group) has reduced over
time. Moreover, the constant term, which captures other factors that influenced the wage
gap that are not accounted by the explanatory variables (the change of the base group),
remains positive and practically does not vary over 2005-2009.
From these results we can draw several considerations. Firstly, although the increase
in women’s human capital endowments contributes to narrowing the gender wage gap as
predicted by the human capital model, the effects are low. Secondly, we do not find strong
evidence of a wage gap due to gender occupational segregation. An exception could be
in the service sector for 2005, in which women have higher representation than men (see
table 7 in appendix) and the returns are greater for men. Nevertheless, this effect is very
low for 2009. Finally, higher returns to experience for men accounts for a large share of
the wage gap.
As mentioned in section 3.2, the literature has stressed that it is difficult to differ-
entiate if this effect is driven by statistical or taste-base discrimination. Regarding the
former, Tenjo, Ribero and Bernat (2005) argue that if human capital variables represent
average productivity indicators for employers, we would expect that greater endowments
are associated with lower differences in wages. However, in the data we observe that the
returns to experience and schooling are larger on average for men, although the latter
effect is marginal for 2009 (see figures 4 and 5). Moreover, these authors suggest that
evidence of statistical discrimination in the results of the decomposition might be shown
by a positive constant term and negative coefficient for the human capital variables. In
39
this regard, we observe the opposite for the case of experience. However, it is difficult to
make this assertion for educational attainment, as the dummy variables capture the effect
of a given category compared to the based group (which is represented by the intercept).
However, as we mentioned in the previous section the returns to education are greater for
men in both years. Therefore, the wage structure effects are in the same vein of the theory
of taste-based discrimination. As Becker’s (1971) model predicts, there is a reduction in
the wage gap during the period of study and also in the discrimination in the returns to
experience and education, however we should interpret this result with cautious as our
time span is short (four years). These considerations constitute the baseline to analyze
how this picture has changed across the distribution.
40
T
a
b
le
4
:
G
e
n
d
e
r
W
a
g
e
G
a
p
:
O
a
x
a
ca
-B
li
n
d
e
r
D
e
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
,
2
0
0
5
-2
0
0
9
O
L
S
C
o
rr
e
ct
e
d
fo
r
se
le
ct
iv
it
y
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
5
U
si
n
g:
M
al
e
co
ef
.
P
o
ol
ed
co
ef
.
M
al
e
co
ef
.
P
o
ol
ed
co
ef
.
M
al
e
co
ef
.
P
o
ol
ed
co
ef
.
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
M
ea
n
lo
g
w
ag
e
ga
p
:
E
[l
n
(w
m
)]
−
E
[l
n
(w
f
)]
0.
18
89
0.
18
89
0.
13
88
0.
13
88
0.
23
54
0.
23
54
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
5)
C
om
p
os
it
io
n
eff
ec
t
-0
.0
65
6
-0
.0
63
5
-0
.0
80
6
-0
.0
61
8
-0
.0
61
7
-0
.0
61
8
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
2)
%
-3
4.
7%
-3
3.
6%
-5
8.
1%
-4
4.
5%
-2
6.
2%
-2
6.
3%
W
ag
e
st
ru
ct
u
re
eff
ec
t
0.
25
45
0.
25
23
0.
21
94
0.
20
07
0.
29
70
0.
29
71
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
5)
%
13
4.
7%
13
3.
6%
15
8.
1%
14
4.
5%
12
6.
2%
12
6.
3%
N
ot
es
:
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
n
at
u
ra
l
lo
ga
ri
th
m
of
re
al
h
ou
rl
y
w
ag
es
.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
co
m
p
u
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
D
el
ta
m
et
h
o
d
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
T
h
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ca
te
go
ri
es
ar
e:
se
co
n
d
ar
y
co
m
p
le
te
,
te
rt
ia
ry
or
te
ch
n
ic
al
in
co
m
p
le
te
;
P
ac
ifi
c
an
d
A
tl
an
ti
c
re
gi
on
s;
em
p
lo
ye
e;
op
er
at
io
n
al
an
d
se
rv
ic
es
w
or
ke
rs
;
an
d
in
d
u
st
ri
al
se
ct
or
.
S
ou
rc
e:
A
u
th
or
’s
ca
lc
u
la
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
E
M
N
V
20
05
an
d
20
09
.
41
6.4 The Gender Wage Gap Across the Distribution
6.4.1 RIF Regressions
We now analyze the determining factors of the gender wage gap at the 10th, 50th and 90th
percentiles using the RIF regression method. The results for the unconditional quantile
regression for 2005 and 2009 are reported in tables 11 and 12 respectively. The sign and
statistical significance of almost all coefficients are quite similar to the regressions for the
mean wages. Therefore, in this section we focus on discussing how the returns to the
factors analyzed differ across the distribution and during the period of study.
As expected, returns to education increase as we move up in the wage distribution,
especially for those individuals with complete tertiary or technical education. As in the
case of the mean, the gaps in returns to schooling have diminished for 2009, especially
at the upper and lower part of the distribution. Meanwhile, returns to experience are
heterogeneous across the wage distribution and during the period of study (see figure 8).
In 2005, returns to experience are greater for men at the 50th and 90th percentiles, while is
higher for women at the 10th percentile. In contrast, in 2009 men have greater returns to
experience at the extreme points of the distribution, while women are better remunerated
at the median. In both years, it is remarkable to notice the large difference in returns by
gender at the 90th percentile. This picture suggests that experience might not have the
same importance in the decomposition of the wage gap along the wage distribution.
Figure 8: Cumulative Returns to Experience Across the Wage Distribution
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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In relation to job-related characteristics, being self-employed and an employer increases
wages compared to employee (reference group). This pattern is the same across the wage
distribution, except for self-employed at the 10th percentile and female’s employers at the
lower part. Professionals, technicians and managers received higher wages than operators
and services workers (reference group), except at the bottom of the distribution. Among
non-skill workers there is no a clear pattern in their returns compared to the base group
in both years and across the distribution. Furthermore, the wage rate among workers in
commercial and service activities does not differ from industrial workers (reference group)
across the distribution, except at the median (50th percentile), in which the returns of
workers in service activities are higher. It is worth noticing that the returns in all the
categories analyzed are higher as we move up in the distribution. Finally, at regional level
the picture is not so different at the different percentiles from the results for the mean
wages.
6.4.2 Which Factors are Driving the Gap Across the Distribution?
In this section we explore which factors determine the gender wage gap across the wage
distribution using the estimates from the unconditional quantile regression. As we men-
tioned in the introduction of this study one of the advantages of the RIF method is that
it is possible to compute a detailed decomposition of the gender wage gap across the
distribution. Table 13 in appendix reports the aggregate decomposition at different per-
centiles. As was mentioned in section 5, the dummy variables are interpreted as the effect
of a category relative to the base group. It is interesting to notice that for 2005 the wage
gap along the distribution is driven by the wage structure effect, while for 2009 is driven
by the composition effect (see figure 9).
The decompositions show that for 2005 (see figure 9) the wage structure accounts for
almost all the wage gap in the lower part of the distribution (10th-30th percentiles), as
the differences in observed characteristics between groups are marginal. Moreover, the
wage structure is greater above the 30th percentile, but the greater endowments of women
offsets to some extent the effect of the wage structure. Therefore, although the sticky floor
effect might be accounted by discrimination, there might be higher level of discrimination
at the upper half of the distribution.
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Figure 9: Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap at Different Percentiles
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Source: Author’s calculation based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
In contrast, for 2009 (see figure 9) the gaps are reduced at the lower and upper part of
the distribution in comparison to 2005. This effect is mainly driven by a reduction in the
wage structure effect. In fact the wage structure is quite similar along the distribution,
except at the 90th percentile in which this effect is higher. Furthermore, the pattern
of the wage gap as we move up in the percentiles (30th-90th percentiles) is driven by a
reduction in the wage differential due to greater women’s endowments. In fact, at the
90th percentile, the large difference in endowments favoring women offset a higher effect
of the wage structure. These results suggest that while the wage gap is small at the upper
part of the distribution, the sticky floor effect is still determined by discrimination.
By looking at the contribution of each covariate, it is possible to provide a better
understanding of the gender wage differential at the different percentiles analyzed. In
order to simplify the report of the results, we focus on the variables that show the larger
effects at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile. The complete results of the decompositions
are presented in tables 14 and 15 in appendix.
The composition effect appears to contribute to a greater reduction in the wage dif-
ferences for 2005 and 2009 as we move up in the distribution. At the 10th percentile, the
low wage gap due to differences in observed characteristics is mainly accounted by higher
men’s endowments among self-employed and in sales and clerical occupations. At the me-
dian (50th percentile), the difference in wages is reduced by higher women’s endowments
in terms of human capital (education and experience) and in self-employed, professional,
technical and managerial occupations, and service workers. Despite women’s advantages
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in these characteristics, the composition effect reduced the wage gap by 0.06-0.07 log
points only in both years. However, at the top of the distribution (90th percentile), the
composition effect contributes to reducing the wage gap in 0.20-0.22 log points in the
period of study and in 2009 this effect almost offsets the wage structure. This is because
women have greater endowments than men in terms of complete tertiary and technical
education, self-employed and among professional, technical and managerial and sales and
clerical occupations.
The wage structure effects show that the difference in returns to the covariates vary
across the distribution in 2005 and 2009. At the bottom part, those women working in
commercial and service activities seem to face greater discrimination compared to the
base group (those with secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete education,
living in the Pacific or Atlantic regions, working as employee in operational and services
occupations in the industrial sector). However, the reduction in discrimination towards
those women holding none or primary incomplete education, primary complete or sec-
ondary incomplete education and those who work in sales and clerical occupations have
contributed to decreasing the wage structure at the 10th percentile during the period of
study.
At the median, despite a considerable reduction in the returns to experience favoring
men and a drop in the discriminatory levels of those women holding primary complete or
secondary incomplete, the wage structure slightly increases over time. To some extent this
is due to a greater discrimination for those women living in the central region, working
in sales and clerical occupations and higher men’s returns for the base group. At the top
of the distribution, discrimination in the returns to experience accounts for a large share
of the wage structure in both years. Nevertheless, there is an increase in discrimination
for those women working in professional, technical and managerial, and sales and clerical
occupations relative to the base group. In contrast, a reduction in discrimination is
observed for those women working in the service sector and at the different educational
categories.
In overall, the detailed decompositions show that women advantages in terms of hu-
man capital and in some job-related characteristics contributed to reduce the wage gap
at the upper half of the distribution, especially at the top. At the lower part, discrimina-
tion accounted for a large share of the wage differential, being those women working in
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commerce and service activities more discriminated compared to the base group. Also,
while discrimination in returns to experience is marginal at the median, it is still present
at the top of the distribution. Moreover, there is a positive change in the constant term
at the lower half of the distribution. This implies that there are other factors influencing
the wage structure that cannot be attributed to the explanatory variables.
From these results we can observe that the picture at different percentiles vary among
themselves as well as from the mean, as other country-case studies have shown. Firstly,
we now observe the presence of occupational segregation due to discrimination at the
10th percentile. This is evidenced by the fact that women have higher representation
than men in the commerce and service activities (see table 16 in appendix) but face a
greater discrimination in their returns to these characteristics compared to the base group
in 2005 and 2009. This situation is similar among professional, technical and managerial,
and sales and clerical occupations at the 90th percentile, especially for 2009 (see table 16
in appendix).
Meanwhile, as in the case of the mean, we also find evidence of taste-based discrimi-
nation in the way described by Becker (1971). Men have greater returns to human capital
compared to women. Also, the higher returns to experience and to other unobserved
characteristics favoring men drive the effect of the wage structure at the upper half of
the distribution. Moreover, there is a reduction in the wage gap over time, along the
distribution and in the discrimination in the returns to experience and education. These
results are in line with Becker’s (1971) predictions. Nevertheless, as in the case of the
mean, we should be cautious with this interpretation due to the short time span analyzed
(four years).
As we mentioned in subsection 5.4, we might understate the level of discrimination
if women are concentrated in certain sectors due to discriminatory practices. We argue
that this might be our case. Although it is difficult to test this issue in the data, we can
provide an intuitive idea about it. In table 16 in appendix, it is observed that women
tend to be concentrated in commercial and service activities and in sales and clerical
occupations. Agurto et al. (2008) states that women tend to be concentrated in this type
of activities due to the role of “stereotypes” in the Nicaraguan society. Therefore, the
actual effect of discrimination might be greater. However, we do not believe that this is
the case for professional, technical and managerial occupations, as this category is the
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best remunerated in the labor market (see table 1) and usually individuals with greater
human capital are hired. In this case, it is difficult to assert whether such effect is related
to segregation due to discrimination or if other forms of discrimination are driving this
result.
Finally, it is likely that potential experience overstates actual experience, especially
for women (Arends, 1992; Scott, 1992). Therefore, in order to explore to which extent the
effect of potential experience is overstated in our results, we estimate the decompositions
at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles using occupational tenure instead of potential
experience. We do so only for 2005 due to data availability on occupational tenure only
in this survey. As mentioned before, it is important to highlight that this variable does
not necessarily reflect the returns to experience over the life-cycle. The results of the
decompositions are presented in table 17 in appendix. As we can observe, we reach the
same conclusions than before, as the results does not vary considerably. Therefore, we
focus on the effect captured by occupational tenure. It is found that an increase in the
wage gap due to a higher tenure in occupations for men compared to women, as was
reflected in the graphical inspection in subsection 3.1.1 (see figure 3). Furthermore, the
difference in returns to experience is higher for men, but the effect is lower compared to
the one found with potential experience. Thus potential experience is likely to understate
the endowment effect and overstate the wage structure effect.
7 Conclusions
Women in urban Nicaragua have lower wages on average than men for 2005 and 2009.
This situation is also observed across the wage distribution. The gap is larger at the
bottom part, which provides evidence of a “sticky floor effect” during the period analyzed.
In this study we explore in detail which factors influence these differences, the effect of
labor market participation and is updated the wage differential for 2009. For this task,
using data from the National Household Living Standards Survey (EMNV), we applied
an Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition (standard and correcting for potential selection
bias) of the mean wage and the novel Recentered Influence Function (RIF) regression
method introduced by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) for the wage distribution.
The results for 2005 and 2009 suggest that age and education have strong impact in
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the decision of participation in the labor market of both groups, while the need for income
seems to be more important for women’s decision. The latter finding points to an evidence
of substitution in household work, in which children (especially girls) perform most of the
home tasks (Agurto et al., 2008). These results are robust to different definitions of labor
market participation. Nevertheless, we do not find a clear evidence of selection bias,
therefore it is likely that the observed characteristics of the working individuals are not
very different from those who are out of the labor market (voluntary and non-voluntary
unemployed).
Looking at the decomposition of the mean wages, it is observed that discrimination
accounted for a large share of the differences in wages in urban areas, confirming previous
evidence for the country. We argue that the wage gap is driven by taste-based discrimina-
tion in the way stated by Becker (1971) and we do not find support to a mean wage gap
due to gender occupational segregation. Moreover, the discriminatory levels in average
wages have been reduced over the period of study.
Meanwhile, looking at the decomposition across the wage distribution the picture is
different from the mean, as other country-case studies have shown. In 2005, discrimina-
tion appears to have a different effect on the wage gap across the distribution. In contrast,
for 2009 the level of discrimination has been reduced at the lower and upper part and
now the wage structure is similar along the distribution, except at the top. The wage
structure (including the effect of discrimination) captures almost all the sticky floor effect
in both years, but discrimination tend to be higher at the upper half of the distribution.
Nevertheless, higher women endowments in human capital and some job-related charac-
teristics contribute to offset the effect of discrimination in both years as we move up in
the distribution.
We argue that discrimination takes different forms along the distribution. We found
evidence of occupational segregation due to discrimination at the bottom part. In con-
trast, at the upper half there appears to be taste-based discrimination outlined in Becker’s
(1971) view, although there is a discriminatory effect for those women working in profes-
sional, technical and managerial occupations that is somewhat puzzling. In fact, the effect
of discrimination is difficult to measure with exact precision. Firstly, potential experience
is likely to overstate actual experience and thus understate the endowment effect and
overstate the wage structure effect. Secondly, the inclusion of occupational categories is
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likely to understate discrimination as women are concentrated in commercial and services
activities due to the role of “stereotypes” in the Nicaraguan society (Agurto et al. 2008).
Moreover, The results should be treated with caution as decomposition methods provide
descriptive results of the differences in the labor market but not structural relations and
causal estimations. This is because unobserved characteristics, potential sample selection
and endogeneity could also influence the results (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2010).
The results highlight the importance of designing policies that narrow the gender
wage gap. For example, for women with lower wages, policies should be oriented towards
reducing discrimination in commercial and services activities. Meanwhile, for women
with higher wages, policies should be focused on promoting the reduction of employer’s
discrimination based on taste among professional, technical and managerial occupations.
In addition, discrimination in sales and clerical occupations should be tackled. In this
regard, the reduction in discrimination during the period of study suggests that the policy
shift during Ortega’s administration could be contributing to the wage convergence.
Future research should be oriented as follows. Firstly, it should explore the selection
into job-categories between men and women and test if this has an effect on labor market
participation and on the decomposition of the wage gap. Secondly, our results from the
RIF regression method should be confirmed by applying a reweighting approach combined
with the RIF method in the way suggested by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2010). Finally,
when a new survey becomes available, the determinants of the gender wage gap should be
tested in order to make a better evaluation of Ortega’s policies focused on gender equity.
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Appendices
Figure 10: Real GDP growth (%) in Nicaragua, 1980-2009
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Table 5: Urban labor Market Characteristics by Gender, 2005
Unemployed
Variable Working Voluntary Non voluntary
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age 34.66 36.62 19.24 30.00 27.80 27.82
Age group (%)
Age 14 to 24 28.20% 18.96% 92.14% 51.74% 58.44% 51.91%
Age 25 to 29 14.39% 15.00% 1.95% 9.04% 11.93% 16.44%
Age 30 to 34 12.84% 12.34% 0.19% 7.34% 4.94% 7.97%
Age 35 to 39 10.15% 13.99% 0.74% 5.00% 5.46% 7.74%
Age 40 to 44 9.48% 11.75% 0.48% 5.23% 4.86% 3.87%
Age 45 to 49 9.37% 11.71% 0.51% 4.98% 3.82% 4.21%
Age 50 to 54 5.61% 7.70% 0.09% 5.79% 2.52% 3.05%
Age 55 to 59 5.50% 5.02% 0.51% 4.47% 4.49% 3.18%
Age 60 to 65 4.46% 3.53% 3.39% 6.41% 3.55% 1.63%
Years of education 8.61 9.16 9.40 8.03 8.33 9.79
Education levels (%)
None or Primary Incomplete 26.38% 25.60% 12.62% 27.46% 27.69% 18.16%
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete 44.11% 34.04% 64.24% 50.30% 46.02% 40.41%
Secondary Complete, Tertiary or Technical Incomp. 17.36% 23.78% 19.90% 17.56% 17.11% 29.58%
Tertiary and Technical Complete 12.15% 16.58% 3.24% 4.67% 9.17% 11.85%
Region (%)
Managua 41.95% 40.74% 37.13% 37.28% 38.88% 50.73%
Pacific 30.53% 31.18% 34.14% 30.79% 32.41% 24.41%
Central 20.58% 21.22% 20.30% 23.36% 22.35% 18.78%
Atlantic 6.94% 6.86% 8.43% 8.56% 6.36% 6.08%
Household characteristics
Household size (#) 5.95 5.84 6.21 6.19 6.40 6.21
Married (%) 63.53% 47.58% 6.31% 45.66% 29.09% 37.58%
# employed persons in HH 1.57 1.63 1.07 0.97 0.95 1.01
# children < 14 years old in HH 1.66 1.68 1.37 1.77 1.66 1.76
Number of observations 3,437 2,551 718 2,662 763 576
Notes: Sample includes individuals between 14 and 65 years old. 69.89% of the men and 44.07% the women in the sample
were classified as working, as they reported positive hours and earnings in the primary occupation. Outliers and missing values
were eliminated from the sample.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005.
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Table 6: Urban labor Market Characteristics by Gender, 2009
Unemployed
Variable Working Voluntary Non voluntary
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age 35.34 36.81 21.03 29.99 29.07 29.60
Age group (%)
Age 14 to 24 23.05% 16.94% 88.70% 51.06% 49.60% 44.00%
Age 25 to 29 17.14% 15.04% 1.32% 10.61% 14.25% 17.19%
Age 30 to 34 12.43% 13.86% 0.12% 6.87% 8.35% 9.21%
Age 35 to 39 11.89% 15.02% 0.35% 5.18% 6.07% 10.07%
Age 40 to 44 9.63% 11.77% 0.47% 5.28% 5.40% 5.39%
Age 45 to 49 9.80% 10.20% 0.36% 5.60% 4.66% 4.92%
Age 50 to 54 6.88% 8.38% 1.31% 4.26% 4.87% 3.43%
Age 55 to 59 5.61% 5.36% 1.03% 4.84% 4.12% 3.22%
Age 60 to 65 3.59% 3.43% 6.35% 6.29% 2.69% 2.57%
Years of education 8.96 9.48 9.56 8.63 8.49 9.37
Education levels (%)
None or Primary Incomplete 25.17% 24.58% 11.70% 23.09% 25.30% 22.64%
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete 41.32% 32.23% 61.27% 49.50% 47.99% 38.08%
Secondary Complete, Tertiary or Technical Incomp. 20.21% 23.46% 23.30% 21.73% 18.02% 25.59%
Tertiary and Technical Complete 13.30% 19.74% 3.73% 5.67% 8.70% 13.69%
Region (%)
Managua 38.74% 41.03% 40.63% 36.71% 40.41% 42.90%
Pacific 31.06% 31.38% 30.51% 30.96% 32.95% 26.46%
Central 21.39% 20.09% 21.09% 23.17% 20.97% 23.37%
Atlantic 8.80% 7.50% 7.77% 9.17% 5.68% 7.28%
Household characteristics
Household size (#) 5.25 5.13 5.45 5.46 5.92 6.25
Married (%) 66.27% 49.92% 8.06% 46.09% 35.61% 39.15%
# employed persons in HH 1.32 1.38 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.71
# children < 14 years old in HH 1.39 1.44 1.09 1.43 1.38 1.78
Number of observations 4,421 3,545 1,089 3,299 1,104 737
Notes: Sample includes individuals between 14 and 65 years old. 66.84% of the men and 46.76% the women in the sample
were classified as working, as they reported positive hours and earnings in the primary occupation. Outliers and missing values
were eliminated from the sample.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2009.
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Table 7: Job-related Characteristics by Gender, 2005-2009
2005 2009
Variable Male Female Male Female
Hours worked 50.58 44.75 49.59 44.18
Potential experience 20.05 21.45 20.38 21.33
Occupational tenure 6.82 6.14 - -
Occupational category (%)
Employee 71.03% 58.33% 64.53% 57.03%
Self-employed 22.14% 37.86% 34.04% 42.40%
Employer 6.83% 3.81% 1.43% 0.57%
Economic sector (%)
Industry 44.69% 21.40% 41.12% 16.77%
Commerce 24.83% 33.80% 25.16% 35.89%
Service 30.48% 44.80% 33.73% 47.34%
Occupation classes (%)
Non-skill workers 28.75% 28.45% 28.99% 30.73%
Professional, Technical and Managerial 14.21% 21.01% 16.84% 20.39%
Sales and Clerical 14.67% 36.82% 12.58% 38.24%
Operational and Services Workers 42.37% 13.72% 41.59% 10.64%
Number of observations 3,437 2,551 4,421 3,545
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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Table 9: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition, 2005-2009
(Composition Effect)
2005 2009
Male coef. Pooled coef. Male coef. Pooled coef.
Mean log wage gap:
E[ln(wm)]− E[ln(wf )] 0.1889 0.1889 0.1388 0.1388
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Composition effect -0.0656 -0.0635 -0.0806 -0.0618
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Contribution of X to the composition effect:
None or Primary Incomplete -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0022
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete -0.0142 -0.0184 -0.0218 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Tertiary and Technical Complete -0.0229 -0.021 -0.0175 -0.0232
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience -0.0436 -0.0354 -0.023 -0.0195
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience2 0.0286 0.0233 0.0175 0.0144
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Managua 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0020
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Central 0.0006 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0008
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Self-employed -0.0080 -0.0229 -0.0097 -0.0109
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Employer 0.0221 0.0242 0.0051 0.0051
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Professional, Technical and Managerial -0.0233 -0.0261 -0.0127 -0.0127
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sales and Clerical 0.0160 0.0286 0.0030 0.0248
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Non-Skill -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0032 0.0032
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Commerce -0.0043 -0.0068 -0.0091 -0.0084
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Service -0.0157 -0.0089 -0.0118 -0.0097
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wages.
Standard errors computed using the Delta method are reported in parentheses.
The reference categories are: secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; Pacific and Atlantic regions; em-
ployee; operational and services workers; and industrial sector.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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Table 10: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition, 2005-2009
(Wage Structure Effect)
2005 2009
Male coef. Pooled coef. Male coef. Pooled coef.
Mean log wage gap:
E[ln(wm)]− E[ln(wf )] 0.1889 0.1889 0.1388 0.1388
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Wage structure effect 0.2545 0.2523 0.2194 0.2007
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Contribution of X to the wage structure effect:
None or Primary Incomplete 0.0153 0.0155 -0.0243 -0.0246
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete 0.0397 0.0439 -0.0095 -0.0113
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Tertiary and Technical Complete 0.0121 0.0103 -0.0339 -0.0282
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Experience 0.291 0.2829 0.1467 0.1432
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Experience2 Squared -0.155 -0.1496 -0.0861 -0.0830
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Managua -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0114 -0.0110
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Central 0.0174 0.0172 0.0449 0.0462
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Self-employed -0.0691 -0.0542 -0.0221 -0.0210
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Employer -0.0067 -0.0088 0.0001 0.0000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Professional, Technical and Managerial -0.0405 -0.0377 0.0035 0.0035
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Sales and Clerical 0.0076 -0.0050 0.0591 0.0373
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Non-Skill -0.0779 -0.0781 0.0145 0.0144
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Commerce 0.0064 0.0089 0.0066 0.0059
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Service 0.0934 0.0865 0.0113 0.0093
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 0.1232 0.1232 0.1200 0.1200
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real hourly wages.
Standard errors computed using the Delta method are reported in parentheses.
The reference categories are: secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; Pacific and Atlantic regions; employee;
operational and services workers; and industrial sector.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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Table 14: Detailed Decomposition at Different Percentiles, 2005
Composition effect Wage structure effect
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Total effect: 0.036 -0.0679 -0.2042 0.3237 0.1883 0.4234
(0.0249) (0.0244) (0.0418) (0.0491) (0.0417) (0.0741)
None or Primary Incomplete -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0017 0.0390 0.0308 -0.0399
(0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0034) (0.0406) (0.0288) (0.0451)
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete -0.0193 -0.0134 -0.0025 0.0801 0.0784 -0.0505
(0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0112) (0.0431) (0.0335) (0.0562)
Tertiary and Technical Complete -0.0034 -0.0155 -0.0583 -0.0047 0.0021 0.0402
(0.0027) (0.0052) (0.0193) (0.0139) (0.0179) (0.0624)
Experience -0.0375 -0.0399 -0.0514 -0.1009 0.2721 0.5039
(0.0206) (0.0168) (0.0237) (0.2753) (0.1350) (0.3118)
Experience2 0.0276 0.0263 0.0316 0.0583 -0.1546 -0.2500
(0.0193) (0.0139) (0.0191) (0.1766) (0.0812) (0.1643)
Managua 0.0021 0.0024 0.0020 0.0202 -0.0097 -0.0267
(0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0411) (0.0284) (0.0621)
Central 0.0009 0.0004 0.0002 0.0504 0.0198 0.0055
(0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0247) (0.0121) (0.0201)
Self-employed 0.0437 -0.0250 -0.0529 -0.0849 -0.0548 0.0159
(0.0125) (0.0102) (0.0164) (0.0517) (0.0308) (0.0473)
Employer 0.0056 0.0166 0.0402 -0.0017 -0.0082 -0.0126
(0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0117) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0200)
Professional, Technical and Managerial 0.0016 -0.0137 -0.0720 -0.0466 -0.0478 0.0032
(0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0207) (0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0778)
Sales and Clerical 0.0272 0.0227 -0.0436 0.0494 -0.0152 0.0555
(0.0188) (0.0141) (0.0280) (0.0549) (0.0487) (0.0752)
Non-Skill -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0519 -0.1186 -0.0969
(0.0034) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0423) (0.0363) (0.0564)
Commerce -0.0013 -0.0044 0.0037 0.0163 0.0092 -0.0618
(0.0063) (0.0048) (0.0092) (0.0439) (0.0344) (0.0622)
Service -0.0078 -0.0203 0.0006 0.1774 0.0800 0.1122
(0.0086) (0.0072) (0.0131) (0.0615) (0.0471) (0.0881)
Constant 0.1233 0.1050 0.2255
(0.1542) (0.1286) (0.2226)
Notes: Dependent variable is the RIF at the th percentile.
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses.
The reference categories are: secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; Pacific and Atlantic regions; employee;
operational and services workers; and industrial sector.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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Table 15: Detailed Decomposition at Different Percentiles, 2009
Composition effect Wage structure effect
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Total effect: 0.0203 -0.0719 -0.2196 0.2203 0.1958 0.2921
(0.0331) (0.0217) (0.0491) (0.0587) (0.0330) (0.0805)
None or Primary Incomplete -0.0030 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0318 0.0127 -0.0881
(0.0068) (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0560) (0.0271) (0.0489)
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete -0.0219 -0.0239 -0.0212 -0.0407 0.0298 -0.0637
(0.0089) (0.0064) (0.0089) (0.0493) (0.0262) (0.0451)
Tertiary and Technical Complete -0.0047 -0.0076 -0.0569 -0.0183 -0.0314 -0.0312
(0.0073) (0.0043) (0.0187) (0.0262) (0.0191) (0.0549)
Experience -0.0245 -0.0196 -0.0349 0.3802 0.0073 0.3230
(0.0150) (0.0096) (0.0206) (0.2973) (0.1588) (0.2917)
Experience2 0.0228 0.0149 0.0236 -0.2924 -0.0338 -0.0680
(0.0165) (0.0085) (0.0170) (0.1850) (0.0896) (0.1559)
Managua -0.0033 -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0252 -0.0044 -0.0462
(0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0362) (0.0246) (0.0481)
Central -0.0006 0.0003 0.0008 0.0145 0.0413 0.0274
(0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0351) (0.0197) (0.0423)
Self-employed 0.0184 -0.0153 -0.0470 -0.0704 0.0095 0.0188
(0.0099) (0.0047) (0.0130) (0.0604) (0.0300) (0.0617)
Employer 0.0030 0.0024 0.0111 0.0029 0.0003 -0.0069
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0070) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0066)
Professional, Technical and Managerial 0.0006 -0.0107 -0.0334 -0.0430 -0.0007 0.0639
(0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0145) (0.0390) (0.0260) (0.0559)
Sales and Clerical 0.0422 0.0092 -0.0505 -0.0402 0.0618 0.1244
(0.0277) (0.0148) (0.0393) (0.0689) (0.0527) (0.0828)
Non-Skill 0.0022 0.0052 0.0022 0.0307 -0.0032 -0.0190
(0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0027) (0.0633) (0.0354) (0.0559)
Commerce -0.0067 -0.0052 -0.0108 0.0689 -0.0272 -0.0157
(0.0095) (0.0048) (0.0098) (0.0561) (0.0381) (0.0528)
Service -0.0041 -0.0179 -0.0004 0.1052 -0.0064 -0.0381
(0.0125) (0.0071) (0.0134) (0.0767) (0.0487) (0.0822)
Constant 0.1799 0.1402 0.1114
(0.1765) (0.1347) (0.1936)
Notes: Dependent variable is the RIF at the th percentile.
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses.
The reference categories are: secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; Pacific and Atlantic regions; employee;
operational and services workers; and industrial sector.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005 and 2009.
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Table 17: Detailed Decomposition at Different Percentiles, 2005
(Using Occupational Tenure)
Composition effect Wage structure effect
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Total effect: 0.0530 -0.0437 -0.1798 0.3067 0.1641 0.3991
(0.0236) (0.0240) (0.0420) (0.0485) (0.0413) (0.0752)
None or Primary Incomplete -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0008 0.0517 0.0368 -0.0213
(0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0021) (0.0395) (0.0282) (0.0366)
Primary Complete or Secondary Incomplete -0.0156 -0.0089 0.0048 0.0888 0.0909 -0.0339
(0.0067) (0.0062) (0.0105) (0.0403) (0.0339) (0.0538)
Tertiary and Technical Complete -0.0044 -0.0166 -0.0598 0.0008 0.0078 0.0453
(0.0028) (0.0055) (0.0197) (0.0139) (0.0180) (0.0623)
Occupational tenure 0.0198 0.0263 0.0134 -0.0681 0.0671 0.1017
(0.0103) (0.0121) (0.0102) (0.0853) (0.0611) (0.1114)
Occupational tenure2 -0.0206 -0.0219 -0.0127 -0.0003 -0.0455 -0.0561
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0081) (0.0434) (0.0293) (0.0542)
Managua 0.0023 0.0028 0.0023 0.0123 -0.0092 -0.0207
(0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0411) (0.0285) (0.0620)
Central 0.0008 0.0004 0.0001 0.0504 0.0190 0.0064
(0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0246) (0.0122) (0.0199)
Self-employed 0.0452 -0.0216 -0.0600 -0.0817 -0.0591 0.0265
(0.0125) (0.0100) (0.0171) (0.0496) (0.0309) (0.0471)
Employer 0.0059 0.0162 0.0432 -0.0007 -0.0082 -0.0099
(0.0021) (0.0042) (0.0123) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0204)
Professional, Technical and Managerial 0.0020 -0.0130 -0.0719 -0.0374 -0.0416 0.0044
(0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0208) (0.0271) (0.0295) (0.0790)
Sales and Clerical 0.0314 0.0251 -0.0371 0.0467 -0.0196 0.0469
(0.0185) (0.0142) (0.0281) (0.0551) (0.0491) (0.0756)
Non-Skill -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0546 -0.1154 -0.0944
(0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0012) (0.0431) (0.0359) (0.0560)
Commerce -0.0014 -0.0053 0.0031 0.0080 0.0058 -0.0638
(0.0064) (0.0050) (0.0092) (0.0434) (0.0347) (0.0619)
Service -0.0094 -0.0234 -0.0043 0.1772 0.0888 0.1213
(0.0086) (0.0075) (0.0132) (0.0593) (0.0472) (0.0899)
Constant 0.1137 0.1465 0.3468
(0.1493) (0.1191) (0.2022)
Notes: Dependent variable is the RIF at the th percentile.
Bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses.
The reference categories are: secondary complete, tertiary or technical incomplete; Pacific and Atlantic regions; employee;
operational and services workers; and industrial sector.
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 2005.
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